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THE 1826 CONTRACT FOR 
CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES AT THE 
PENSACOLA NAVAL STATION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR HISTORICAL 
RESEARCH USING AGENCY THEORY 
Abstract: This contract dispute enhances our understanding of agency 
relationships and fosters greater recognition of the limitations and 
hazards of historical research using an agency literature framework. 
The accounting records, related memoranda, and reports submitted 
also provide insight into the nature and character of early defense 
contract accounting and relationships between these contractors and 
the government. Difficulties confronted by the Navy in securing a 
contractor; contract terms; civilian contractor's project accounting 
records, related memoranda, and correspondence with naval authori-
ties are reviewed. The post-contract correspondence provides insight 
into how early 19th century government contractors attempted to 
resolve disputes with the government. 
Introduction1 
Today, government is the largest consumer of products and 
services in the United States. Government contracting with pri-
vate sector suppliers has been a constant from the earliest days 
of U.S. history. Modern legislation, e.g., the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Act and Truth in Negotiations Act, have established 
standards governing contractors' dealings with the government. 
The Cost Accounting Standards Board has issued standards to 
promote uniformity and consistency in the way defense contrac-
tors measure, assign, and allocate contract costs. The Defense 
Contract Audit Agency, the General Accounting Office, and 
1
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other audit agencies have responsibilities for auditing compli-
ance with contract terms. In short, doing business with the gov-
ernment has become highly institutionalized; contractor rights 
and obligations are highly circumscribed by contract, regula-
tion, and law. A formal process for mediating contract disputes 
is in place, and when mediation fails there is access to the court 
system. In our era, this formal institutionalized framework is 
largely taken for granted. Such was not always the case. The 
contracting environment confronting the government contractor 
of the early 19th century stands in stark contrast to the norm of 
today. An appreciation for the efficacy of our current bureau-
cratic contracting environment can be gained by examining an 
early government contract. Moreover, the dangers inherent in 
extending modern rational expectations and assumptions to ear-
lier periods of history become evident. Modern assumptions 
may be invalid in a pre-bureaucratic era where justice was more 
personalized and less systematized. In earlier periods, due pro-
cess was less assured, and arbitrariness and personally moti-
vated animosity or favoritism was less restrained. Such condi-
t ions may p r e e m p t and nega te a s s u m p t i o n s unde r ly ing 
historical research using an agency theory framework.2 
In 1826, Samuel Keep of Boston received a contract from 
the federal government to superintend the construction of the 
original facilities at the Pensacola Naval Air Station then known 
as the Pensacola Naval Station or Navy Yard.3 This 19th century 
contract dispute affords some insights that may contribute to 
our contemporary understanding of agency relations. Specifi-
cally, much of contemporary accounting agency theory focuses 
on instances where the agent breaches, reneges, or otherwise 
shortchanges the principal to the contract. In this instance, how-
2
 See Max Weber's short essay on bureaucracy in From Max Weber, H. H. 
Gerth and C. W. Mills (eds), Oxford University Press 1946, pp. 216-221, for a 
discussion of the significant differences between justice based on personal fac-
tors and justice based on abstract procedures and rules of law. 
3
 In 1975, the John C. Pace Library at The University of West Florida ac-
quired the personal correspondence and accounting memoranda of Samuel 
Keep. Among these records are a copy of the original contract, payment vouch-
ers for supplies and materials, payroll records, and construction progress reports 
as well as many letters addressed to members of his family and such notables of 
Keep's day as President Andrew Jackson, Vice-President Henry Clay, Senator 
Daniel Webster , Secretary of the Navy Samuel Southard , and William 
Bainbridge who was the highest ranking naval officer of the time and chairman 
of the Board of Navy Commissioners. These documents provide the basis for this 
p>aper and unless specifically stated otherwise all quotes come from them. 
2
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 22 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/3
Gray and Calvasina: 1826 Construction Contract for Pensacola Naval Station 37 
ever, it was the principal, i.e., the federal government, that re-
neged on the contract despite diligent performance by the civil-
ian contractor/agent. 
Contractual relations are frequently a good deal more com-
plicated than simple principal-agent models suggest. While 
simple principal-agent models may be helpful in understanding 
relationships, the contract under consideration in this article is 
complex in structure and operation. There is a hierarchy of con-
trol in this early defense contract that is typical of many modern 
contracts. Specifically, roles are less clearly defined than simply 
agent-principal, i.e., an actor may be simultaneously an agent of 
some principal and the principal of another agent. In this in-
stance, both the civilian contractor and the naval officers were 
acting as agents of the federal government. However, from the 
perspective of the civilian contractor/agent Samuel Keep, the 
agent/naval officers were principals. 
A basic assumption underlying agency theory is that all par-
ties to a contract behave in a rational, utility maximizing man-
ner [Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 307; Fama, 1980, p. 289]. Of-
ten, agency theory literature depicts actors in agency models as 
self-interested individuals with the goal of maximizing net in-
come [Baiman, 1990, p. 155]. However, Mills has stated that 
income or wealth utility maximization alone is not sufficient to 
explain the behavior of all agents [Mills, 1993, p. 802]. In some 
circumstances, agents may seek to maximize some utility func-
tion that transcends pursuit of personal financial advantage, 
e.g., a sense of duty, honor, loyalty. The Keep contract provides 
some insight into agency relationship frictions that can not be 
directly attributed to income maximization. The naval authori-
ties who were party to this contract as principals did not reap 
any personal advantage, and yet they were unrelenting in their 
refusal to honor the terms of the contract with the civilian con-
tractor. 
The Keep contract is particularly interesting because en-
forcement of its terms became an issue; it gave rise to one of the 
first defense contract disputes in American history. Contempo-
rary agency theory presumes that contract enforcement is a 
matter of judicial intervention. Specifically, Baiman states: 
The central focus of agency theory is the employment 
contract (which includes the agent's payment schedule 
and the monitoring system). Contracts are enforced by 
legal institutions. The decision of legal institutions as to 
whether an employment contract has been honored or 
3
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violated depends upon the evidence that can be submit-
ted by the contracting parties to the legal enforcement 
mechanism. [Baiman, p. 168, 1990] 
Keep's efforts to enforce the terms of his contract with the 
government suggest that this agency theory assumption was not 
satisfied in the early 19th century. The contractor's pursuit of 
reparations from the government through personal lobbying and 
pleading provides a stark contrast to the institutionalized con-
flict resolution assumed by agency theory. 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE CONTRACT 
The United States bought Florida from Spain for $5,000,000 
in 1819. This transfer was formally accepted in Pensacola on 
July 17, 1821 by General Andrew Jackson, who was then mili-
tary commander of the territory. In 1822, Congress established 
the Territory of Florida with Pensacola as its capitol; Jackson 
was appointed its first governor. 
During the Napoleonic Wars, most of the Spanish and Por-
tuguese colonies in Latin America took advantage of the un-
settled conditions in Europe to break away from their mother 
country. By the end of 1822, Mexico and many countries in 
Central and South America had freed themselves from colonial 
rule, and the United States had formally recognized their inde-
pendence. However, the three leading monarchies of Europe, 
i.e., Russia, Austria, and Prussia, encouraged Spain and Portu-
gal to reassert their authority over their former colonies. In an 
address to Congress in December 1823, President James Monroe 
proclaimed that the United States would defend all independent 
nations of the Western Hemisphere against European interven-
tion; this Monroe Doctrine became a cornerstone of United 
States foreign policy. 
This backdrop of political upheaval and uncertainty pro-
vided the impetus for major military development along the 
southern coast of the United States. Over a period of twenty-five 
years a series of strategically placed forts and navy yards were 
built. In Pensacola, Ft. Pickens and Ft. McRee were built to 
guard the entrance to the port; the harbor itself became home to 
the first permanent U.S. Navy installation on the Gulf Coast. At 
the same time, fifty miles to the west, Ft. Morgan and Ft. Gaines 
were built to guard the entrance to the port of Mobile, Alabama. 
At the conclusion of this defense build-up, many passes from the 
open sea to important seaports were guarded by forts [Bailey, 
1966, pp. 236-242]. 
4
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THE TASK 
The first of the defense installations to be built was the 
Pensacola Navy Yard. On February 25, 1825, a bill authorizing 
construction of facilities for a new navy yard and depot at 
Pensacola, Florida was passed by the U.S. Senate, and the 
House gave its approval on March 3, 1825 [Pearce, 1980, p. 5]. 
At the time, journeymen construction workers or "master 
mechanics" were scarce. There was an abundance of work for 
such skilled workmen along the populated Eastern Seaboard. It 
was not easy to entice workmen to leave familiar surroundings, 
family and friends, to journey three weeks (under the best of 
sailing conditions) to a frontier town known for yellow fever 
epidemics and poor living conditions. 
THE PRINCIPAL 
An important component of any principal's task in the prin-
cipal-agent relationship is the selection of the "best" agent. The 
principal in this contractual relationship was the Board of Navy 
Commissioners, most frequently referred to in correspondence 
of the day as the Navy Board. This organization was charged 
with responsibility for letting the contract and supervising con-
struction.4 To this end, the Navy Board circulated notices solicit-
ing bids among qualified "master builders," published invita-
tions to bid in major newspapers, and posted notices in federal 
government offices. After unsuccessfully negotiating with sev-
eral contractors for over a year and a half, the Navy Board 
concluded negotiations with Samuel Keep. 
The circumstances surrounding the Navy Board's accep-
tance of Keep as labor contractor for the Pensacola Navy Yard 
are necessary background for understanding subsequent events 
relating to the contract. First, the Navy Board was motivated 
and eager to commence work on the new facilities as quickly as 
possible. Moreover, established and presumably knowledgeable 
contractors were reluctant to bid on the project or demanded 
compensation that the Navy Board deemed excessive. As will 
become apparent later, the fact that the Navy Board granted the 
contract to Keep is itself some measure of its desperation and 
4
 The Board of Navy Commissioners was created by act of Congress in 1815 
and was made up of three captains (then the highest rank in the Navy). Commis-
sioners were appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate and were 
invested with delegated executive authority. 
5
Gray and Calvasina: 1826 contract for construction of facilities at the Pensacola Naval Station and its implications for historical research using agency theory
Published by eGrove, 1995
40 The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1995 
frustration. Certainly, given more favorable circumstances, the 
Navy Board would not have awarded the contract to Keep. 
Both principal and agent confront considerable risk when 
they enter into a contract each knowing relatively little about 
the other. The Navy Board and Keep had no on-going relation-
ship, and there was an extreme degree of information asymme-
try present in the contract negotiation. Given the time and dis-
tance between Boston and Pensacola (three weeks by ship down 
the Atlantic coastline, around Key West, and up the west coast 
of Florida) and the communications capabilities of the time, 
Samuel Keep must have been markedly ignorant of the condi-
tions in Pensacola. By contrast, the Board was better informed. 
As a consequence of receiving reports from Navy personnel al-
ready in place in Pensacola, the Board was knowledgeable of 
local conditions at the proposed construction site. In addition, 
after unsuccessfully negotiating with other prospective contrac-
tors, the Navy Board knew precisely what other contractors re-
quired in terms of compensation to take on the Pensacola 
project. Presumably, this information asymmetry worked to the 
advantage of the Navy Board in its contract negotiations with 
Keep. In addition, Keep was totally inexperienced in bidding on 
government contracts. Overall, Keep must have been at a great 
disadvantage in contract negotiations. 
From the perspective of agency theory, each party to this 
contractual relationship was motivated by self-interest. No 
doubt, Keep thought he had negotiated a contract that would 
allow him to break into government contracting and maximize 
his personal net worth. From the perspective of the Navy Board, 
they needed the work to commence as soon as possible at the 
cheapest possible rates. To this end, the Navy Board exploited 
the asymmetric information set they possessed and Keep's ea-
gerness to make a start in the construction business. The Board 
was successful in securing below market rates for the project as 
evidenced by the fact that no other supplier was interested in 
the contract. 
THE AGENT 
Samuel Keep, an unmarried man in his mid-twenties, was 
the youngest son of an established and prosperous Boston area 
builder and the brother of Dr. Nathan C. Keep who founded the 
Dental School at Harvard University. Keep's personal correspon-
dence and his business records suggest that he was an articulate 
6
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and well- educated man of his time. Samuel served his appren-
ticeship working for his father on various construction projects 
in and around Boston. Previously, Keep had never been awarded 
or even bid a single construction contract, his very first venture 
as an independent builder in his own right was the Pensacola 
Navy Yard contract. Given Keep's personal circumstances — 
young, well to do, and eager to begin a business in his own right 
— it is reasonable to assume that he was less risk averse than an 
established builder. From Keep's point of view, the Pensacola 
contract must have looked like a great opportunity. In summary, 
Samuel Keep was young, inexperienced as a builder and totally 
unproven as a contractor. Certainly, this is not the profile of the 
ideal candidate for a major government contract. It seems that 
Keep's principal qualification was his lack of risk aversion, as 
evidenced by his willingness to accept the contract. 
THE CONTRACT 
According to the terms of the contract signed on September 
8, 1826, Keep was to go to Pensacola and superintend the con-
struction of the wharf and buildings at the new navy yard. All 
construction materials including tools and implements were to 
be supplied by the Navy Board. Keep was to hire "8 master 
masons and 10 skillful wharf builders" and transport them to 
the project site. In addition, Keep agreed to remain in Pensacola 
with his builders for two years. In compensation, Keep was to 
receive: 
$2,000 per annum for himself and $2.50 per day for the 
mechanics to be in full compensation for all the serv-
ices which may be rendered by him or them and for all 
charges and expenses which he the said Keep may in-
cur and subject himself to on account of this contract. 
The contract provided that Keep's salary and the $2.50 per day 
for the mechanics would commence with departure from Bos-
ton. Payments were to be made to Keep at the Pensacola Naval 
Station upon the presentation of bills to the local commanding 
officer. 
PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS 
Before departing from Boston, Keep recruited 8 masons 
and 10 wharf builders. According to Keep's correspondence, the 
prevailing wage in Boston for such men was $1.75 per day. To 
induce men to travel to the Florida hinterlands, separated from 
7
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friends and family, Keep offered premium wages as well as food 
and lodging. Keep negotiated worker wage rates based on his 
judgment of each worker's skill and experience. Exhibit 1 is a 
list of Keep's crew and their associated pay rates. Wages ranged 
from $2.10 to $3.00 per day with an average daily wage of $2.33. 
This was a premium of 25 percent over the existing wage in 
Boston without considering the value of food and lodging pro-
vided by Keep in Pensacola. 
EXHIBIT 1 
8
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Each builder executed a labor contract (some preprinted 
and others handwritten) agreeing to work with Keep for two 
years at the Pensacola Naval Station. Exhibit 2 is an example of 
the preprinted contracts signed by each worker. The difference 
between the worker's wages and the $2.50 government contract 
amount was justified in Keep's mind by the fact that he provided 
food and lodging for the workers and paid the cost of their 
transportation from Boston to Pensacola. 
EXHIBIT 2 
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Besides hiring builders, Keep hired an accounting clerk who 
was charged with responsibility for maintaining project records. 
This clerk contracted to work for the sum of $50 per month plus 
food and lodging; an amount that was approximately equal to 
the wages received by the master builders. The salary of the 
accounting clerk was not reimbursable cost under the terms of 
the contract; therefore, Keep absorbed this cost out of his $2,000 
per year. Surviving project records and memoranda are testimo-
nials to the thoroughness and competence of this accounting 
clerk. However, one might reasonably question the business 
judgment of Samuel Keep; he committed better than 30 percent 
of his annual contract compensation for the services of a full-
time bookkeeper. 
The contract granted Keep permission to erect on navy yard 
property "such barracks or other buildings as may be found 
necessary and convenient for the accommodation of himself and 
men while employed at the naval station." The materials and 
labor cost for construction of the barracks were to be born by 
Keep. Before departing from Boston, Keep purchased a consid-
erable amount of food, building materials for the barracks in-
cluding 15,000 feet of lumber and nails, furnishings for the bar-
racks, clothing, and medical supplies. Cash d i sbursement 
records for these purchases total $848.98. According to the ship-
ping contract presented as Exhibit 3, the transport of the build-
ing materials and supplies to Pensacola via Key West cost $116. 
The cost of passage on the same ship for Keep and his nineteen 
men was $380. Therefore, documented suppor t exists for 
$1,344.98 in cost before the first dollar of government contract 
money was received. Available personal correspondence and ac-
counting records give no indication as to the source of Keep's 
start-up money. However, it seems reasonable to surmise that 
these funds were provided by his family. 
10
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EXHIBIT 3 
PROJECT ACCOUNTING RECORDS 
There is no evidence of a double entry bookkeeping system 
in any of the project records. The financial records are single 
entry "day book" accounts that chronicle cash disbursements 
and receipts. There are no financial s ta tements for ei ther 
Samuel Keep personally or the construction project. Labor re-
ports submitted to the officer in charge of the navy yard consti-
tuted billing under this contract. Hence, construction labor in 
terms of duties assigned or work performed and labor time for 
each of Keep's employees is fully documented. 
The records show that the first three weeks of October 
1826, i.e., the first three weeks at the construction site, were 
spent constructing the barracks for the crew. In addition to the 
building materials brought from Boston, brick and other con-
struction materials for the barracks were purchased locally. For 
the period October 1826 to June 30, 1827, local purchases for 
food and building materials totaled $1,288.82. These expendi-
tures are suppor ted by i temized s ta tements from var ious 
Pensacola suppliers. Exhibit 4 is an itemized statement of cash 
payments made to one Pensacola supplier for the period Octo-
ber 26-December 30, 1826. 
11
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EXHIBIT 4 
The principal project accounting records were reports of 
days worked submit ted to the commanding officer of the 
Pensacola Naval Station as a basis for payment under the con-
tract. During the developmental stages of the project all men 
were engaged in such activities as digging sand or felling and 
hewing timber for use in the construction. During this period, 
project reports were submitted on an infrequent basis. Between 
December 1826 and March 1827 three reports which covered 
12
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overlapping intervals — October 27-November 30, October 27-
February 28, and February 16- February 28 — were submitted. 
The 5 column tabular February 16- February 28, 1827 project 
report presented as Exhibit 5 is typical of these reports. After 
February 16, project reports were submitted biweekly in a 
EXHIBIT 5 
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EXHIBIT 6 
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"spreadsheet" format. Exhibit 6 is typical of these reports. Be-
ginning with the February 16-28 report, these reports show that 
the men were assigned to a multitude of small and large projects 
which were going on simultaneously. The columnar headings on 
these reports were consistent: workers' name, occupation (either 
brick layer or wharf builder), days worked (no hourly work 
records were maintained and the smallest t ime increment which 
appears in these reports is 1/2 day), and project (commandant 's 
house, hospital, barracks chimney, wharf, et al.) 
THE CONTRACT DISPUTE 
As noted, Keep invested a significant amount of money in 
performance of this contract before arrival at the job site. Upon 
arrival in Pensacola, Keep presented a bill for $945 (21 days in 
passage for 18 men at $2.50 per day) to the commanding officer. 
Unfortunately, Keep discovered that the local commanding of-
ficer, Lt. Commander Edward R. McCall, did not feel bound by 
the Navy Board's contract. This officer refused to pay Keep 
$2.50 per man as the contract stated. Why a United States Navy 
officer would take it upon himself to act in this way is pure 
speculation. The officer's actions were clearly inconsistent with 
the explicitly stated terms of Keep's contract with the Navy 
Board. At this juncture, Keep threatened to take his craftsmen 
and leave Pensacola. Faced with this threat the commanding 
officer backed down and paid Keep. However, McCall wrote the 
Navy Board for instructions about how he should proceed in the 
future. 
There is little doubt that personal animosity existed between 
McCall and Keep. According to Keep's correspondence, McCall 
referred to Keep as "You God damned Yanke." McCall was de-
scribed by Keep as "a vile and intemperate man." It is evident 
from reading Keep's personal correspondence that he feared 
McCall. Early in his stay in Pensacola, Keep began carrying two 
loaded pistols because McCall had threatened him. 
Little is known of Keep's antagonist — Edward R. McCall. 
However, according to the 1827 Navy Register, McCall was born 
in South Carolina, commissioned an officer in the U.S. Navy on 
January 1, 1808, and promoted to the rank of lieutenant com-
mander on March 3, 1825 when he assumed command of the 
Pensacola Navy Yard [Navy Register, 1827, pp. 782]. The per-
sonal antagonism between McCall and Keep coincidentally par-
alleled larger historical currents. In many ways, the ill tempered 
re la t ionship between Keep, a Massachuse t t s Yankee, and 
15
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McCall, a fiery South Carolinian, seems to personify regional 
animosities that afflicted the United States at this time in its 
history. 
Subsequently, Keep submitted his labor bill for the month 
of October. The bill submitted included the time spent by the 
men building the barracks. McCall refused to pay stating that 
"men were not to draw wages when they did not work." As 
justification, Keep cited a clause in his contract which stated 
that he "shall not suffer for the want of materials and tools" and 
pointed out that the Navy had failed to provide materials to 
begin construction and that if the men had not built the bar-
racks they would have been idle. Signed stores receipts show 
that it was not until October 27, 1826 that the navy delivered 
supplies and tools to Keep for the actual construction project. 
According to the terms of Keep's contract, it was the responsibil-
ity of the Navy to provide all tools, implements, and materials 
for the construction. 
In response to McCall's request, the Navy Board's instruc-
tions were that he should authorize payment for the actual 
amount to be received by each worker and that payment should 
be made directly to the worker and not Keep. This is in clear 
contradiction of the explicit terms of Samuel Keep's contract 
with the Navy Board. At this point, it seems that the Navy Board 
summarily abrogated its contract with Keep. 
Given the hindsight provided by almost 170 years, it ap-
pears that the Navy Board acted in bad faith by agreeing to 
Keep's terms, alluring him to the job site in the remote hinter-
lands, and ignoring the explicitly stated terms of the contract. 
Surviving documents leave little doubt that the Navy Board 
acted dishonorably. In the correspondence files between the 
Navy Board and Samuel Keep, there is no indication that the 
Navy found any fault with either the pace or quality of Keep's 
work at the Pensacola Naval Station. To the contrary, even Lt. 
Commander Edward R. McCall, the very same commanding of-
ficer who refused to honor the payment terms of Keep's con-
tract, described the quality of Keep's work as "commendable." 
Whether the government's conduct in this matter is an iso-
lated incident or part of a widespread pattern of "bad faith" 
contract dealing is a question not easily answered. It may be 
that the seeds of this contract dispute lie in a personality clash 
between two agents of the Navy Board — Keep and McCall. 
Acting as agent for the Navy Board in its dealings with Keep, 
McCall challenged the terms of the contract and refused to dis-
16
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burse funds according to its terms. It is significant that once 
McCall acted, the Navy Board never wavered in its support of 
his position. Perhaps, loyalty to a fellow career naval officer was 
the overriding motivation of the Navy Board. If this was the 
case, then any civilian contractor doing business with the Navy 
did so at their own peril. Written contracts could be ignored or 
completely disregarded with impunity — not a very comforting 
prospect for an outsider doing business with the government. 
Without the difference between what he received from the 
Navy and what he paid the men, Keep had nothing to defray the 
cost of food and lodging provided to his craftsmen. Keep pro-
tested to the Navy Board and attempted to bring formal charges 
against McCall and Lt. Commander Thomas S. Cunningham, Sr. 
who succeeded McCall as commandant of the Pensacola Naval 
Station. Secretary of the Navy Samuel Southard's response to 
Keep's attempt to bring charges against the officers was simply 
to assert that "as a civilian Keep had no standing" that allowed 
him to bring charges against uniformed officers of the United 
States Navy. Keep was fired by the Navy Board on June 28, 1827 
and accused of "practicing deception before the contract was 
signed in that he assured them (the Navy Board) that he could 
not obtain mechanics for less than $2.50 per day when he knew 
that he could and that he actually did hire them for less and did 
put the difference in his own pocket amounting to $3.00 per day 
to his own advantage." 
This assertion of "deception" by the contractor sounds par-
ticularly disingenuous and implausible considering the fact that 
the Navy Board had unsuccessfully attempted to sign a contrac-
tor for a year and a half before awarding the contract to Keep. 
The Board was in a position to know the going rate of pay for 
skilled workmen. 
A more plausible explanation is that the Navy Board chose 
to back the actions of its career officers notwithstanding the 
terms of the contract. Or, perhaps the Board concluded that 
they had made a bad bargain, and first tried to rewrite the con-
tract to their liking and when that did not work they simply 
fired the contractor after much of the work had been completed. 
In a letter addressed to his brother shortly before his July 
1827 departure from Pensacola, Keep stated, "I have spent more 
to fulfill my contract than I should make in ten years if I should 
stay so long in this country for two thousand per annum." The 
Navy Board's flagrant disregard for his contract left Keep with 
little recourse. Keep left Pensacola and went to Washington to 
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pursue his claims against the Navy Board. 
Today, in the event of a contract dispute, the issue as to 
whether a contract has been honored or violated is likely to be 
decided in the court system. Evidence is submitted according to 
specific rules of admissibility in an ostensibly impartial court 
proceeding and the contested issue is decided by judge or jury. 
This manner of conflict resolution has been institutionalized, is 
expected, and largely taken-for-granted. Such was not true in 
Keep's day; he did not retain legal counsel nor did he sue the 
government for breach of contract. At this point in our history, 
it seems that government was less securely based on the rule of 
law. Justice was more a matter of personal contact and influ-
ence. 
Keep pursued his claim personally with the Washington bu-
reaucracy. Unfortunately, Keep's experience battling the Wash-
ington bureaucracy was frustrating and dispiriting. Initially, he 
pursued his claim for reparations with the civilian Secretary of 
the Navy. In an October 1827 letter to Secretary of the Navy 
Southard, Keep stated: "Such has been the high handed injus-
tice & injury to me, that I have come to the defensive action to 
demand redress at the bar of Congress for the severe losses I 
have sustained." Secretary Southard was not sympathetic to 
Keep's claims against the Navy, but suggested that Keep docu-
ment his case and submit it to the Treasury Department for a 
decision on the merits of his case. 
Acting on Southard's recommendation, Keep took his cause 
to the Treasury Department's 4th Auditor's Office which was 
charged with adjudicating claims made against the government. 
In a March 28, 1828 opinion addressed to Navy Secretary 
Southard, the auditor disallowed Keep's claims by declaring: 
Having carefully examined the documents in the case of 
Mr. Samuel Keep late Superintendent referred to me by 
you, I have the honor to report, that nearly all the 
charges made by Mr. Keep appear to be founded upon 
an assumed violation of his rights and an improper in-
terference in his duties, by E. R. McCall and Thomas S. 
Cunningham Sr. U.S.N, commanders, officers at the 
Pensacola Station. Not having any thing explanatory or 
defensive from these two officers, you will readily see 
the improbability of my forming any decision on the 
justice of Mr. Keep's claims. The vouchers to support 
the several items in his account are not sufficiency clear 
to justify me in allowing it. By letter from the Navy 
Commissioners it will be seen that his salary was to 
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cease on or about the 28th June 1827. If however these 
claims were to be decided on at present, without fur-
ther information, according to the terms of the con-
tract, I do not think they ought to be allowed. [[T. 
Matkins], 18 March 1828] 
Keep was equally unsuccessful in stimulating any interest in 
his dispute with members of either the U.S. House or Senate. 
Daniel Webster, who represented Keep's home state of Massa-
chusetts in the U.S. Senate, stated in a letter to Keep that "he 
could not attend to applications of this kind, that the business is 
between you and the Navy Board" [Keep, 23 April, 1828]. 
For three years, Keep remained in Washington and peti-
tioned the government for redress for the Navy's conduct. Not-
withstanding his persistent efforts to remedy the wrongs done to 
him by the government, he was totally unsuccessful. After termi-
nation of his contract, Keep never received another penny from 
the federal government. 
In 1830, a week after his marriage to a wealthy Washington 
widow, Keep died an untimely and tragic death at the age of 29. 
Keep and his new bride checked into a Baltimore inn while 
awaiting a ship sailing to Boston. Following dinner on the 
evening before their planned departure, Keep drank from a 
stone jug thinking it contained apple cider. Unfortunately, the 
stone jug contained a caustic acid used for cleaning wood-
burning stoves. Despite the best efforts of physicians to purge 
his system of the caustic acid, he lingered a week in what was 
described in a letter to his Boston family as "tormenting pain" 
before he finally died. 
CONCLUSION 
As it turned out, this contract became something of a Greek 
tragedy. Keep's successful pursuit of the government contract to 
build naval facilities at Pensacola recalls the maxim, "For fools 
rush in where angels fear to tread." Both literally and figura-
tively, Keep's fatal undoing was the Pensacola Navy Yard con-
tract with the government. 
From the vantage point of 170 years, the motivation that 
moved the Navy Board to renege on its contract with Keep is 
largely speculation and conjecture. Agency theory suggests that 
the government agent's actions were motivated by self-interest. 
And yet, Lt. Commander McCall, who was Keep's chief antago-
nist, gained nothing monetarily from his actions. Self-interest 
19
Gray and Calvasina: 1826 contract for construction of facilities at the Pensacola Naval Station and its implications for historical research using agency theory
Published by eGrove, 1995
54 The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1995 
narrowly defined as furtherance of monetary advantage does not 
measure up to the task of explaining the conduct of government 
agents in this situation. Thus, Mills' concerns with the applica-
tion of agency theory into the study of accounting history ap-
pear to be supported. 
Agency theory assumes the rule of law. The legal system is 
assumed to enforce the contract based on publicly observable 
and verifiable information. At this stage in the development of 
our country, the rule of law was not systematized, institutional-
ized, and enforced without regard to the personalities involved 
to the extent assumed in modern agency theory. Therefore, the 
Keep contract demonstrates the hazards of projecting modern 
agency theory too far in historical research. If agency theory is 
to be used in historical research, its limitations must be ac-
knowledged. Agency theory must allow for certain frictions, e.g., 
furtherance of personal antagonism and overriding loyalty, to 
afford an adequate explanation for conduct. 
It is unfortunate that neither members of Congress nor rep-
resentatives of the executive branch of government were inter-
ested or sympathetic to Keep's claims against the Navy. Had an 
institutionalized appeal process been in place, e.g., an indepen-
dent and impartial civilian contract review board, perhaps Keep 
would have fared better. 
In general, the level of literacy and competence exhibited by 
participants in this contract is impressive. The project account-
ing records and supporting memoranda are remarkable for their 
clarity and completeness. Contrary to the government auditor's 
commentary, Keep and his accounting clerk maintained meticu-
lous records of cash disbursements and detailed reports on con-
struction labor. For the nine months (October 1826 to June 
1827) all the construction activities at the Pensacola Naval Sta-
tion are completely chronicled. Construction costs, at least in 
terms of labor provided by the civilian contractor, are fully 
documented. Labor cost information was recorded in a way that 
facilitated cost analysis by individual structure or task, i.e., labor 
costs for the commandant 's house, base hospital, and other 
buildings and structures were each tracked separately. The 
project financial records are the product of a rudimentary single 
entry system which simply chronicled cash receipts and dis-
bursements activities in a day book format. No double entry 
ledgers were maintained nor were financial statements for the 
project prepared. 
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